This paper studies the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure and discusses its welfare implications. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder is a competitor in the product market. Then welfare depends on the types of the contracts available and on the ownership of patents. In particular, we examine whether leader's innovation is considered to be socially more valuable than follower's innovation. We show that there are situations when follower's innovation generates larger welfare. Given the private incentives for innovation, a licensing policy may induce the desired firm to win the patent race.
Introduction
Transfer of superior technology is a topic of growing interest. It has many facets. Our particular interest in this paper is to examine the contractual aspect of the problem, and then to study its welfare implications. This, however, crucially depends on the nature and structure of the product market. All the works, so far contributed in the literature, assume either a monopoly, or a competitive market, or a simultaneous-move oligopoly. Surprisingly, the question of technology transfer in a leadership structure, and its welfare implications, are not addressed at all.
1 This paper is a modest attempt to fill up this gap. To be precise, we assume an initial Stackelberg structure of two firms, with one firm, either leader or follower, owning a patent of a cost-reducing technology. We study the question of optimal licensing contracts from the perspective of the society as a whole, and also from the viewpoint of consumers and producers, separately.
Our prime focus of the paper is to examine whether the leader's innovation, or follower's innovation, is more valuable to the society. We further analyze the licensing policy that will induce the desired firm to win the patent race.
In this paper we restrict our attention to fee licensing and royalty licensing only. 2 Now, which licensing contract is appropriate from the perspective of the innovator, depends on a number of factors. These are:
what market structure prevails, whether the inventing firm is also the producing firm, whether imitation of a new technology is easy, whether patent protection is perfect, and also, whether the government of the country allows both fee licensing and royalty licensing, or whether it puts restrictions on the amount of fee and/or royalty, etc. Constrained by these factors, technology licensing can be either a fee licensing or a royalty licensing alone, or a mix of the both. In a survey of firms, Rostoker (1984) finds that 39% of cases have royalty alone, 13% have fee alone, and the remaining cases have fee plus royalty. To the study of the technology licensing agreements between Indian and foreign firms, it is observed that lower royalty rates are associated with higher lump sum payments (see Alam (1985) , for instance).
Theoretical works on the question of optimal licensing contracts are many. Kamien (1992) has provided an excellent survey. In Kamien and Tauman (1986) , Katz and Shapiro (1986) , Kamien et al. (1992) and Muto (1993) , the patent holder is a non-producer, an outsider to the product market. On the other hand, Katz and Shapiro (1985) , Rockett (1990) , Wang (1998) and Kamien and Tauman (2002) model the case when patent holder is an insider, a competitor in the output market. While Muto (1993) has Bertrand 1 Filippini (2002) , Kabiraj (2002) and Yang (2003) also discuss technology l icensing in a Stackelberg structure. In Filippini (2002) , only the leader holds the innovation, whereas in Kabiraj (2002) , the patent holder is a non-producer. However, none of these papers discusses welfare implications of the different licensing contracts. 2 The licensing literature also discusses licensing by means of auctioning. There are situations when the first-price-auction generates larger profits for the patentee as compared to fixed fees and royalties. See, for this result, Kamien and Tauman (1986) , Katz and Shapiro (1986) , Muto (1993) , Kamien et al. (1992) , and Kabiraj (2002) . competition with differentiated products, all other works consider quantity competition with homogeneous goods. Licensing to a perfectly competitive industry by means of a fee-plus-royalty is studied in Kamien and Tauman (1984) . Arrow (1962) studies licensing to a perfectly competitive industry and to a monopoly using royalty only. Rockett (1990) allows firms to choose the age of the technology to be licensed along with the structure of payment.
3 Evidently, none of these works addresses to the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure when innovator is also an insider in the industry.
When patentee is a non-producer, generally fee licensing dominates royalty licensing under Cournot competition, because per unit royalty increases marginal cost of production of the competitors, and hence there is a loss of surplus due to inefficiency in production. Consumers also gain under fee contract by getting lower product price. Its dual result holds in the case of price competition, that is, a royalty contract generates larger rents to the patentee (Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Muto (1993) ). In contrary, when patent holder is a competitor, royalty dominates fee from the perspective of the innovator, because the patent holder enjoys a cost advantage over its rivals (Wang (1998) ).
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Generally it is assumed that either imitation of a new technology is not at all possible or patent protection is perfect so that imitation cannot take place. In such a situation, the innovator or patent holder, who is also a competitor in the same product market, has option to use either fee licensing or royalty licensing (or both). In the absence of this assumption it is, however, difficult to write a royalty contract even when the patentee is a non-producer. The reason is that if the invention is imitated, it is difficult to write a contract enforcing the licensee to pay royalties over the period of the agreement. What will happen is that the imitator will imitate the technology once it is transferred, and thereafter will stop payments of royalties. In such a situation, the licensor is restricted to a fixed fee licensing only (Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Shapiro (1985) ).
Since in our analysis firms have asymmetry of moves, therefore, which firm innovates and which contracts are available to the innovator are quite interesting from the perspective of the welfare analysis.
We show that when both contracts are available to the innovator, follower's innovation is more valuable to the firms in the aggregate, while leader's innovation is considered more valuable from the perspective of consumers' and social welfare. In contrast, if only fee contract is available (this is the case when patent protection is imperfect and imitation of a superior technology is easy), industry profits are larger if leader is the innovator. There are parametric situations when follower's innovation is considered more valuable to the consumers as well as to the society.
5
We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous. This determines welfare of different groups via its effect on the choice of the licensing contract. We have shown that if the licensing contract can be manipulated by means of the government policy, then, no matter which firm innovates, social welfare is larger under fee contract if the innovation is quite small, and royalty contract is socially preferred if the innovation size is relatively larger. For all intermediate cases, fee licensing generates a larger welfare if follower is the innovator, and royalty licensing yields a larger welfare if leader is the innovator.
This leads to the following question: Which contract is to be chosen, as a matter policy, by the government? We have shown that follower has larger incentives to innovate if both royalty and fee contracts are allowed, whereas leader has more incentives if fee contract alone is allowed. Then, conditional on the size of the innovation, the optimal policy should be to allow both royalty and fee licensing if the innovation size belongs to some intermediate interval, but the policy should be allowing fee licensing alone if it is either small or large.
Before we leave this section, some comments are in order about the choice of the product market structure in the paper. Theoretical interest in the paper arises from the fact that no other works have so far discussed the question of optimal licensing contract under the leadership structure, although there is a literature to show that the Stackelberg structure can come out as one subgame perfect equilibrium. 6 The practical significance of the model is that, in the real world, firms, which compete in the market places, are asymmetric, with some firms being dominant and some others week. In the leadership structure, we capture partner asymmetry by means of asymmetry of moves. Moreover, in the real world, there are a number of products the markets for which can be approximated as the leadership structures. For instance, in Indian scenario, where both public and private firms compete in the same industry, the public firms act as price leaders. In the private sector, when one or only a few big firms compete with many small firms (e.g., parts of machine tools sector), the small firms behave as competitive fringe. In the international oil and petroleum markets, the OPEC behaves as price leader.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we discuss the effect of innovation on equilibrium and examine which licensing contract, whether fee licensing or royalty licensing, is optimal from the viewpoint of the innovator. In the third section we explore the implications of the availability of different types of contracts and ownership of patents in terms of consumers', producers' and aggregate welfare; hence, we also examine which firm's innovation is socially more valuable. In the fourth section we 5 We shall later see that it is always the same whether only royalty contracts are available or both royalty and fee contracts are available.
have discussed innovative incentives of each leader and follower under different possible contracts. The fifth section suggests an optimal licensing policy in this context. Finally, the concluding section summarizes the results of the paper.
2 Model: Licensing in a Stackelberg Structure
We first discuss the Stackelberg equilibrium to study the effect of innovation on the equilibrium. Then we discuss the effect of different licensing schemes on that equilibrium.
Stackelberg Structure
We consider a Stackelberg structure with two firms ---firm 1 is leader, and firm 2 follower. So firm 1 is assumed to pre-commit its output level first. Given firm 1's output, firm 2 then decides its optimal production. The market demand function for a homogeneous product is assumed to be linear. This is, in inverse form, given by the equation
where P is the price of the product and i q is the supply of the i-th firm, 2 , 1 = i . Initially, firms are identical, and each firm produces at a constant unit cost of production a c c
We assume that only one firm is capable of inventing a cost-reducing innovation, and the innovation size is exogenous. Also there is no uncertainty. Then the innovating firm comes up with a patent of a costreducing innovation. 
and the corresponding payoffs will be 
From the expression of (2) we observe that when 
The corresponding profits of the firms are 7 In this paper we shall not model the issue of innovation explicitly. Later in Section 4 we shall study innovation incentives of a firm when innovation occurs as a patent race. 
that is, in a Stackelberg structure, if licensing is not allowed, leader's innovation is considered more valuable to the consumers and producers in the sense that leader's innovation generates larger industry output and profits compared to follower's innovation.. Intuition is the following. When both firms have identical technologies, leader produces larger share of output. So when leader holds the patent, further more output is produced using efficient technology. On the other hand, if follower holds the patent, relatively lower output is produced using efficient technology.
Licensing in the Stackelberg structure
Consider the possibility of technology licensing from the innovating firm to the other. The licensing game is the following. The patent holder offers either a fixed fee licensing contract or a royalty-licensing contract. The non-patent holder decides whether to accept the contract. We assume that it will accept if it receives at least its reservation payoff. Then, firm 1 acts as a first-mover in setting its quantity. Finally, firm 2 decides its quantity production, taking firm 1's quantity as fixed. When the patent holder gives the licensing contract, it wants to maximize its total payoff which is the sum of the profits accrued from its market operation and the licensing revenue in the form of either fixed fee or royalty.
Licensing contracts when leader is the innovator
Assume that firm 1 holds the new technology, ε − c , and firm 2 has old technology c . We discuss below technology licensing under each of fee contract and royalty contract. 
Since firm 2's reservation payoff is
π , as is given in (8), which is its payoff under no transfer situation, the corresponding fee of technology transfer is
This gives a total payoff to the licensor from licensing its technology under fixed fee contract as
Then, a fee-licensing contract is profitable if and only if the post-transfer total payoff of the licensor is greater than its payoff under no license situation, that is,
Hence we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: When leader is the innovator, fee licensing is profitable if and only if the innovation size is quite
small (i.e., 9 / ) ( 2 c a − < ε ).
Royalty licensing contract
Under royalty contract the patent holder (here leader) transfers its technology and fixes a royalty per unit of the licensee's output. Then, the optimal royalty rate is given by (see Appendix A) . Note that, in Wang (1998) , royalty contracts dominate fee contracts for all non-drastic innovations. In our case, the interval is shortened. Moreover, there are cases where no licensing dominates licensing even when the innovation is non-drastic. The results of Lemma 1 and 2 are portrayed in the upper portion of We are now in a position to decide the optimal licensing strategy of the leader-cum-innovator.
Comparing (16) and (21) 
Licensing contracts when follower is the innovator
In this subsection we assume that follower holds the patent of the new technology ε − c , whereas leader has its old technology c . Follower decides the optimal licensing contract.
Fixed fee licensing contract
Under fee licensing contract the equilibrium quantities and payoffs will be , 4 and 2 2 1
Note that the quantity and profit expressions in (22) and (23) are exactly the same as that in (12) and (13), that is, the post-transfer equilibrium quantities and payoffs of the firms are the same, independent of the question of who holds the patent of the new innovation. Since firm 1's reservation payoff is its no transfer payoff, 
Hence, we write the following lemma.
Lemma 3: If follower is the innovator, fee licensing is strictly preferred to no licensing if and only if the size of the innovation is small
(i.e., 2 / ) ( c a − < ε ).
Royalty licensing contract
The optimal royalty rate under royalty contract is given by (see Appendix B) . Results underlying Proposition 1 and 2 can be explained as follows. First note that the innovator will always prefer royalty licensing, independent of whether it is the follower or the leader who innovates (although royalty might be set so high that the competitor will refuse, and so no technology transfer actually takes place). So, from the inventor's point of view, it does not matter whether only royalty contracts are available, or both fee and royalty contracts are available. Royalty contract dominates fee because under royalty contract the transferor can retain its competitive advantage in the post-transfer situation, whereas under fee contract it is to compete with the transferee on equal footing. Further, the critical level at which technology transfer becomes profitable is less when leader is the innovator compared to the case when follower is the innovator. The reason is the following. In a leadership structure, because of the move advantage leader has a relatively larger profit in the pre-transfer situation, and, hence, it cannot afford a larger innovation to make the transfer profitable.
Welfare analysis
In this section we provide a welfare analysis from the viewpoint of consumers, producers and in aggregate.
In particular, we examine whose innovation is more valuable to different groups separately as well as to the society as a whole. We also study which contract generates larger welfare to the respective groups.
Consumers' welfare will be measured by consumers' surplus (CS), and producers' welfare by industry profit (Π ). Hence the overall welfare will be estimated by taking the sum of consumers' surplus and industry profit, that is,
. Given the form of the demand function in our paper, we must have 2 / ) ( 2 Q CS = . As we shall see, the respective welfare of different groups depends on three factors, viz., the size of the innovation, the nature of the licensing contract allowed, and whether the innovator is leader or follower.
We assume that firms will make a licensing contract when it is privately profitable. However, whether technology licensing will occur or not depends on the nature of the licensing contract and on the size of the innovation. It also depends on the type of the innovator. For example, if the innovation is drastic, technology licensing will never occur, whoever innovates. In the following analysis, we denote by 
Welfare when both licensing contracts are available
Assume that firms are capable of writing any of fixed fee and royalty contracts. From the results of Proposition 1 and 2 we know that royalty contract strictly dominates fee contract (whenever contracts are feasible). Hence, it does make no difference whether both fee contract and royalty contract are available, or only royalty contract is available. 
Thus, whenever the innovation is non-drastic, the interests of the consumers and producers are diametrically opposing as to which firm should be the innovator. Intuition is that under a royalty contract industry output remains the same at the no-transfer output level, but at that situation output is larger if leader is the innovator. Larger output results in a relatively lower industry profits. Let licensor's profits as well as industry profits will go up. Now consider the scenario, as described by 2 / ) ( c a − < ε , when licensing occurs whoever innovates. Under no licensing situation industry profit with leader owning the innovation is larger than that when follower holds the innovation (i.e., , that is, no transfer output of the follower, when leader holds the innovation, is less than that of the leader when follower is the patent holder. Therefore, industry profit under licensing goes up by a larger amount when follower has the innovation. This dominates to the extent that the post-licensing industry profit under follower's innovation becomes larger than that under leader's innovation.
.

Welfare when only fee contract is available
In this section we assume that the innovator has an option to write a fee contract when it is profitable. From Hence we can write the following proposition.
Proposition 4: Assume that only fee licensing is allowed. Industry profit is always larger if leader is the innovator. Leader's Innovation is also more valuable to the consumers as well as to the society except for the intermediate size of the innovation (i.e., for
) 2 / ) ( , 9 / ) ( 2 [ c a c a − − ∉ ε ),
in which case follower's innovation is considered more valuable.
The reason of why the overall welfare in a particular interval is larger under follower's innovation is simple to understand. In this case fee licensing occurs if and only if follower is the innovator. This increases consumers' welfare to such an extent that the overall welfare becomes larger.
Comparing the results of Propositions 3 and 4, it is now quite clear that the welfare implication of technology transfer depends, to a large extent, on the nature of the contract available to the innovator and the type of the firm that successfully comes up with the innovation. It also depends on the size of the innovation.
Welfare comparison: fee versus royalty licensing
Given the size of the innovation, which firm will come out with the innovation may be thought to be determined by a bidding game (see the next section). In such a situation the government may decide which licensing contract is to be allowed. In this section we examine which contract will generate larger welfare to different groups.
Leader is the innovator
Suppose that leader is the innovator. So when only royalty contract is allowed (or, in fact, we may assume that both contracts are allowed), the aggregate output ) ( 1 R Q and profit ) ( 1 R Π will be given by the expressions of 1 Q and 1 Π in equations (32) and (33) Comparing industry outputs and profits in the above two situations, we shall get
The overall welfare comparisons will yield 
The overall welfare comparison is,
Comparing (44) and (46), and (45) and (47), we write the following proposition. Generally the consumer surplus and the overall welfare move in the same direction. But our results show that there are situations when consumers prefer fee licensing, whereas the overall welfare is larger under royalty licensing.
Proposition 5: (a) No matter which firm innovates, if the innovation is non-drastic
Innovation incentives
In our previous analysis, we have assumed that which firm holds the patent of a superior technology is exogenous in the model. In practice, it may be determined endogenously. Which firm is to be allowed to do R&D may also be a policy question. Sometimes some firms are, technically or financially, more competent to do R&D than others. In the last section we have shown that whether leader's innovation or follower's innovation is (socially) more valuable depends on the nature of the licensing contract available to the firm, given the size of the innovation. So, as a policy, the government may encourage (say, by subsidizing the firm's R&D investment) or discourage some firms' R&D activities. It is again possible that the producing firms are not capable of doing research, but, given the value of research to them, they compete for the output of a research firm. This means, which firm will come out in the innovation race will be determined by a bidding game. 9 The government may be very selective to design its licensing policy and may directly regulate the nature of the licensing contract.
Let us denote by 
, that is, the innovation incentive of a firm is its payoff when it succeeds to innovate but the rival fails, minus its payoff when the rival succeeds but it fails. In other words, this is the maximum amount that a firm can spend on winning the patent of an innovation of size ε .
We further note that when the innovation is drastic (i.e., 
, that is, both leader and follower have identical incentive to win the patent of a drastic innovation. In the following analysis, therefore, we restrict to the assumption that the innovation is nondrastic (i.e., c a − < ε ).
Technology transfer not allowed
In this case the post-innovation payoffs are given by (10) when firm 1 is the innovator, and by (26) 
that is, leader has a larger incentive in this case.
Only fee licensing contract allowed
Assume that only fee licensing is allowed in the post-innovation situation. Then, if firm 1 is the innovator, 
We can then check that
Thus, if only fee licensing is allowed, leader has larger incentives to hold the patent of the innovation.
Both licensing contracts allowed
Now assume that both (fee and royalty) licensing contracts are allowed. We have already noted that fee licensing will never figure in equilibrium in this case. Then, if firm 1 holds the patent, royalty licensing 
Hence, if both contracts are allowed (or only royalty contract is allowed), follower has larger incentives to innovate. Now, based on the analysis of this section, we can write the following proposition. Intuition of the result is the following. The post-transfer industry profit under fee licensing (if transfer occurs) is the same irrespective of who holds the patent. But, there are situations (as defined in terms of the size of the innovation) when transfer can take place only if follower is the innovator. In such a situation, therefore, the loss of payoff to the leader is much larger if it fails to innovate, and, hence, it has larger incentives for innovation. On the other hand, when royalty contract is also available, follower has larger innovative incentives ----due to its move disadvantage, its loss of profit, when it fails to innovate, is much larger compared to that of the leader when leader is unsuccessful in innovation.
The optimal policy choice
In view of our analysis, made in the last two sections, we can now suggest more concretely the policy choices of the government. Throughout the paper we assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous.
Then, given the size of the innovation, in Section 3 we have discussed whose innovation, whether leader's or follower's, is socially more valuable (see Propositions 3 and 4). We have also discussed which licensing contract, whether fee licensing or royalty licensing, generates larger welfare (see Proposition 5). Finally, in Section 4 we have examined which firm has larger incentives to win the patent competition (see Proposition 6 ). This analysis shows that the government of a country can, by its choice of a policy regarding which contract may be allowed in a given situation, influence the innovation decision of a firm, and, thus, it can make sure that the socially desired firm comes up with the innovation. This analysis, therefore, assumes that the government can effectively implement its licensing policy (viz., the contract which is to be allowed and which not), but it cannot directly force a firm to do R&D.
From Proposition 6 we know that if the government restricts t he choice of the firms to fee licensing only, then, in general, leader has larger incentives to innovate. On the other hand, if the firms are allowed to write only royalty licensing contract (or, alternatively, if the firms are allowed to choose either of these contracts, in which case both leader and follower prefer royalty contract), follower has larger incentives to innovate.
10
Then, given that only fee licensing is allowed, so that leader comes out with the innovation, the corresponding industry output and profit will be respectively 
This leads to the following result. This may be explained as follows. If licensing occurs under royalty contract, consumers have nothing to gain compared to no licensing situation, whereas if fee licensing occurs, consumers gain by means of larger outputs and lower product price. Generally, this gain outweighs the loss of profits (if any), and, hence, fee licensing, in general, should be encouraged. But there are situations when fee licensing is not profitable, whereas transfer will occur if royalty contract is available. Allowing royalty contract in such a situation means consumers are not losing anything under technology licensing, but producers' profits as a whole may go up, and, hence, royalty contract is to be favored under this parametric situation. 10 In fact, if only fee licensing is allowed and 9 / ) ( 2 c a − < ε , both leader and follower will have same incentives (see (49)), and also welfare is same, whoever innovates.
Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a two-firm leader-follower structure, with one firm, either leader or follower, holding a patent of an innovation. Clearly, leadership structure is retained if the innovation is nondrastic. We have then studied the possibility of technology transfer between the firms in the situation where only fee licensing is available, or both fee licensing and royalty licensing are available. We have shown that if the innovation is drastic, technology transfer will never take place. However, when the innovation is nondrastic, from the perspective of the patent holder royalty contract strictly dominates fee contract if licensing is at all profitable (Propositions 1 and 2). Thus, it does not matter whether only royalty contract is available, or both contracts are available. There are, however, situations when royalty contract cannot be written, and so fee contract becomes the only option. For instance, royalty contract cannot be written if patent protection is imperfect and imitation of the transferred technology is easy.
Then we have demonstrated that welfare implication of technology transfer depends on who holds the patent of the superior technology and which licensing contract is available to the firms. It also depends on the size of the innovation (assumed exogenous in the paper). From the perspective of the aggregate industrial profit, royalty contract is preferred. This, therefore, calls for a stricter enforcement of patent rules. On the other hand, consumers' welfare is larger under fee licensing. Which contract is preferred from the perspective of the society, however, depends on the size of the innovation. For example, fee licensing is preferred if the innovation size is quite small, and royalty contract is preferred if it is relatively larger. For the middle size innovation, fee licensing gives larger welfare if follower is the innovator and royalty generates larger welfare if leader is the innovator (Proposition 5)
We have also examined whether leader's innovation or follower's innovation is considered more valuable. Our result is the following. If only fee contract is available, industry profit is always larger if leader is the innovator; leader's innovation is also considered to be more valuable to the consumers as well as to the society except when the innovation is of middle level (Proposition 4). On the other hand, if royalty contract is also available, follower's innovation is considered more valuable to the producers, but leader's innovation generates larger welfare to the consumers and to the society (Proposition 3).
We have then examined which firm has larger incentives to innovate. We have assumed that the winner of the patent race is determined by a bidding game. Which contract is available to the innovator is important in this context. In particular, we have shown that if only fee licensing is available, leader will have higher incentives to innovate, whereas if royalty contract is also available, the follower has strictly larger incentives when the innovation is non-drastic. In case of drastic innovation both firms have identical incentives (Proposition 6). This calls for a policy choice by the government as to what should be the socially optimal licensing contract. When objective of the government is to maximize social welfare, the government should restrict the choice of the licensing contract to fee contract alone, except for a small interval of the size of the innovation (Proposition 7). Thus, by its choice of a particular policy, the government can induce the desired firm to innovate the technology. 
